Coldkey: Post-Quantum Age Key Generation and Paper Backup Tool

Coldkey is a command-line tool for generating post-quantum age encryption keys and creating paper backups. It addresses the problem of losing age private keys—essential for decrypting files encrypted with age or sops—by producing printable HTML documents with QR codes.
Installation
# Homebrew (macOS/Linux)
brew install --cask pike00/tap/coldkey
Or with Go
go install github.com/pike00/coldkey/cmd/coldkey@latest
Quick Start with Docker (recommended)
# Pull the image
docker pull ghcr.io/pike00/coldkey:latest
Interactive — generate a key and paper backup
just docker-run
Backup an existing key
just docker-backup /.config/sops/age/keys.txt
All just docker-* commands include security hardening flags: --network none, --read-only, --cap-drop ALL, --security-opt no-new-privileges:true. Output is written to ./output/.
Commands
- Interactive mode (
coldkey): Menu to generate a new key or create a backup from an existing one. - Generate (
coldkey generate [-o PATH] [-f] [--no-backup]): Generate a new post-quantum age key pair (ML-KEM-768 + X25519). Default output to stdout unless-oprovided. - Backup (
coldkey backup [flags] KEYFILE): Create a printable HTML paper backup from an existing key file. - Version (
coldkey version): Print the version string.
Security Model
- Memory: Uses
mlockall(MCL_CURRENT|MCL_FUTURE)to prevent swapping key material to disk. - Files: Written with mode 0600, fsynced; temporaries shredded (3-pass overwrite).
- Process: Secrets passed via stdin/files only, never in process arguments.
- Container: Distroless/static:nonroot image with no shell, non-root UID 65534.
- Memory zeroing: Best-effort
secure.Zero()on key buffers before GC.
QR Code Encoding
Post-quantum age keys store only a 32-byte seed, so keys.txt is typically ~2,089 bytes—fitting in a single QR code (version 40, EC-L supports 2,953 bytes). For larger files, coldkey splits across multiple QR codes using a framing protocol: COLDKEY:<part>/<total>:<data>. Recovery: scan all QR codes in order, strip prefixes, concatenate, and verify SHA-256 checksum.
Paper Backup Contents
The generated HTML includes: title/metadata (date, hostname, user, source path), raw key text in monospace, QR code(s) with capacity annotation, SHA-256 checksum, and step-by-step recovery instructions.
Recovery Procedure
- Scan the QR code or type the raw key text.
- Save to
/.config/sops/age/keys.txt. - Verify:
sha256sum keys.txtmatches the printed checksum. - Test:
sops -d <any .sops file>
Limitations
Go's garbage collector may copy objects in memory, and Go strings are immutable—key material held as a string (e.g. from identity.String()) cannot be securely zeroed. Coldkey performs best-effort zeroing on byte buffers.
📖 Read the full source: HN LLM Tools
👀 See Also

Claude Code --dangerously-skip-permissions vulnerability and open-source defense tool
Lasso Security published research showing indirect prompt injection vulnerabilities in Claude Code when using --dangerously-skip-permissions flag, with attack vectors including poisoned README files, malicious web content, and MCP server outputs. They released an open-source PostToolUse hook that scans tool outputs against 50+ detection patterns.

Audit Your Claude Code Permissions: A Practical Guide to Scoping Tool Access
A Reddit user audited their Claude Code setup and found over-permissioned tools that could edit .env files and production configs. Practical steps: audit global vs. per-project tools, check CLAUDE.md for secrets, and scope file access per directory.
OpenClaw cluster management: keep recovery path outside the cluster
A safer topology for OpenClaw-managed clusters: run Gateway and task state outside, use read-only access, and drive changes via PRs + CI + human-approved merge into Argo CD.

Pro Se Plaintiff Hides AI Prompt Injections in Court Filing
A Connecticut pro se plaintiff hid prompt injections in white, 3-point font in court filings, instructing any AI to side with him. The court caught it and sanctioned him.